The Atomic Human
Abstract
A vital perspective is missing from the discussions we are having about Artificial Intelligence: what does it mean for our identity?
Our fascination with AI stems from the perceived uniqueness of human intelligence. We believe it’s what differentiates us. Fears of AI not only concern how it invades our digital lives, but also the implied threat of an intelligence that displaces us from our position at the centre of the world.
Atomism, proposed by Democritus, suggested it was impossible to continue dividing matter down into ever smaller components: eventually we reach a point where a cut cannot be made (the Greek for uncuttable is ‘atom’). In the same way, by slicing away at the facets of human intelligence that can be replaced by machines, AI uncovers what is left: an indivisible core that is the essence of humanity.
By contrasting our own (evolved, locked-in, embodied) intelligence with the capabilities of machine intelligence through history, The Atomic Human reveals the technical origins, capabilities and limitations of AI systems, and how they should be wielded. Not just by the experts, but ordinary people. Either AI is a tool for us, or we become a tool of AI. Understanding this will enable us to choose the future we want.
The talk is based on Neil’s book, The Atomic Human, published by Allen Lane.
Pre-emptive Apology
Henry Ford’s Faster Horse
It’s said that Henry Ford’s customers wanted a “a faster horse”. If Henry Ford was selling us artificial intelligence today, what would the customer call for, “a smarter human”? That’s certainly the picture of machine intelligence we find in science fiction narratives, but the reality of what we’ve developed is much more mundane.
Car engines produce prodigious power from petrol. Machine intelligences deliver decisions derived from data. In both cases the scale of consumption enables a speed of operation that is far beyond the capabilities of their natural counterparts. Unfettered energy consumption has consequences in the form of climate change. Does unbridled data consumption also have consequences for us?
If we devolve decision making to machines, we depend on those machines to accommodate our needs. If we don’t understand how those machines operate, we lose control over our destiny. Our mistake has been to see machine intelligence as a reflection of our intelligence. We cannot understand the smarter human without understanding the human. To understand the machine, we need to better understand ourselves.
The Atomic Human
The development of what some are calling intelligence in machines, raises questions around what machine intelligence means for our intelligence. The idea of the atomic human is derived from Democritus’s atomism.
In the fifth century bce the Greek philosopher Democritus posed a similar question about our physical universe. He imagined cutting physical matter into pieces in a repeated process: cutting a piece, then taking one of the cut pieces and cutting it again so that each time it becomes smaller and smaller. Democritus believed this process had to stop somewhere, that we would be left with an indivisible piece. The Greek word for indivisible is atom, and so this theory was called atomism. This book considers this question, but in a different domain, asking: As the machine slices away portions of human capabilities, are we left with a kernel of humanity, an indivisible piece that can no longer be divided into parts? Or does the human disappear altogether? If we are left with something, then that uncuttable piece, a form of atomic human, would tell us something about our human spirit.
See Lawrence (2024) atomic human, the p. 13.
The Diving Bell and the Butterfly
The Diving Bell and the Butterfly is the autobiography of Jean Dominique Bauby. Jean Dominique, the editor of French Elle magazine, suffered a major stroke at the age of 43 in 1995. The stroke paralyzed him and rendered him speechless. He was only able to blink his left eyelid, he became a sufferer of locked in syndrome.
See Lawrence (2024) Le Scaphandre et le papillon (The Diving Bell and the Butterfly) p. 10–12.
O M D P C F B V
H G J Q Z Y X K W
How could he do that? Well, first, they set up a mechanism where he could scan across letters and blink at the letter he wanted to use. In this way, he was able to write each letter.
It took him 10 months of four hours a day to write the book. Each word took two minutes to write.
Imagine doing all that thinking, but so little speaking, having all those thoughts and so little ability to communicate.
One challenge for the atomic human is that we are all in that situation. While not as extreme as for Bauby, when we compare ourselves to the machine, we all have a locked-in intelligence.
Incredibly, Jean Dominique wrote his book after he became locked in. It took him 10 months of four hours a day to write the book. Each word took two minutes to write.
The idea behind embodiment factors is that we are all in that situation. While not as extreme as for Bauby, we all have somewhat of a locked in intelligence.
See Lawrence (2024) Bauby, Jean Dominique p. 9–11, 18, 90, 99-101, 133, 186, 212–218, 234, 240, 251–257, 318, 368–369.
Bauby and Shannon
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See Lawrence (2024) Shannon, Claude p. 10, 30, 61, 74, 98, 126, 134, 140, 143, 149, 260, 264, 269, 277, 315, 358, 363.
Embodiment Factors
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bits/min | billions | 2000 | 6 |
billion calculations/s |
~100 | a billion | a billion |
embodiment | 20 minutes | 5 billion years | 15 trillion years |
Let me explain what I mean. Claude Shannon introduced a mathematical concept of information for the purposes of understanding telephone exchanges.
Information has many meanings, but mathematically, Shannon defined a bit of information to be the amount of information you get from tossing a coin.
If I toss a coin, and look at it, I know the answer. You don’t. But if I now tell you the answer I communicate to you 1 bit of information. Shannon defined this as the fundamental unit of information.
If I toss the coin twice, and tell you the result of both tosses, I give you two bits of information. Information is additive.
Shannon also estimated the average information associated with the English language. He estimated that the average information in any word is 12 bits, equivalent to twelve coin tosses.
So every two minutes Bauby was able to communicate 12 bits, or six bits per minute.
This is the information transfer rate he was limited to, the rate at which he could communicate.
Compare this to me, talking now. The average speaker for TEDX speaks around 160 words per minute. That’s 320 times faster than Bauby or around a 2000 bits per minute. 2000 coin tosses per minute.
But, just think how much thought Bauby was putting into every sentence. Imagine how carefully chosen each of his words was. Because he was communication constrained he could put more thought into each of his words. Into thinking about his audience.
So, his intelligence became locked in. He thinks as fast as any of us, but can communicate slower. Like the tree falling in the woods with no one there to hear it, his intelligence is embedded inside him.
Two thousand coin tosses per minute sounds pretty impressive, but this talk is not just about us, it’s about our computers, and the type of intelligence we are creating within them.
So how does two thousand compare to our digital companions? When computers talk to each other, they do so with billions of coin tosses per minute.
Let’s imagine for a moment, that instead of talking about communication of information, we are actually talking about money. Bauby would have 6 dollars. I would have 2000 dollars, and my computer has billions of dollars.
The internet has interconnected computers and equipped them with extremely high transfer rates.
However, by our very best estimates, computers actually think slower than us.
How can that be? You might ask, computers calculate much faster than me. That’s true, but underlying your conscious thoughts there are a lot of calculations going on.
Each thought involves many thousands, millions or billions of calculations. How many exactly, we don’t know yet, because we don’t know how the brain turns calculations into thoughts.
Our best estimates suggest that to simulate your brain a computer would have to be as large as the UK Met Office machine here in Exeter. That’s a 250 million pound machine, the fastest in the UK. It can do 16 billion billon calculations per second.
It simulates the weather across the word every day, that’s how much power we think we need to simulate our brains.
So, in terms of our computational power we are extraordinary, but in terms of our ability to explain ourselves, just like Bauby, we are locked in.
For a typical computer, to communicate everything it computes in one second, it would only take it a couple of minutes. For us to do the same would take 15 billion years.
If intelligence is fundamentally about processing and sharing of information. This gives us a fundamental constraint on human intelligence that dictates its nature.
I call this ratio between the time it takes to compute something, and the time it takes to say it, the embodiment factor (Lawrence, 2017). Because it reflects how embodied our cognition is.
If it takes you two minutes to say the thing you have thought in a second, then you are a computer. If it takes you 15 billion years, then you are a human.
Bandwidth Constrained Conversations
Embodiment factors imply that, in our communication between humans, what is not said is, perhaps, more important than what is said. To communicate with each other we need to have a model of who each of us are.
To aid this, in society, we are required to perform roles. Whether as a parent, a teacher, an employee or a boss. Each of these roles requires that we conform to certain standards of behaviour to facilitate communication between ourselves.
Control of self is vitally important to these communications.
The high availability of data available to humans undermines human-to-human communication channels by providing new routes to undermining our control of self.
The consequences between this mismatch of power and delivery are to be seen all around us. Because, just as driving an F1 car with bicycle wheels would be a fine art, so is the process of communication between humans.
If I have a thought and I wish to communicate it, I first need to have a model of what you think. I should think before I speak. When I speak, you may react. You have a model of who I am and what I was trying to say, and why I chose to say what I said. Now we begin this dance, where we are each trying to better understand each other and what we are saying. When it works, it is beautiful, but when mis-deployed, just like a badly driven F1 car, there is a horrible crash, an argument.
Heider and Simmel (1944)
Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel’s experiments with animated shapes from 1944 (Heider and Simmel, 1944). Our interpretation of these objects as showing motives and even emotion is a combination of our desire for narrative, a need for understanding of each other, and our ability to empathize. At one level, these are crudely drawn objects, but in another way, the animator has communicated a story through simple facets such as their relative motions, their sizes and their actions. We apply our psychological representations to these faceless shapes to interpret their actions [Heider-interpersonal58].
See also a recent review paper on Human Cooperation by Henrich and Muthukrishna (2021). See Lawrence (2024) psychological representation p. 326–329, 344–345, 353, 361, 367.
Computer Conversations
Similarly, we find it difficult to comprehend how computers are making decisions. Because they do so with more data than we can possibly imagine.
In many respects, this is not a problem, it’s a good thing. Computers and us are good at different things. But when we interact with a computer, when it acts in a different way to us, we need to remember why.
Just as the first step to getting along with other humans is understanding other humans, so it needs to be with getting along with our computers.
Embodiment factors explain why, at the same time, computers are so impressive in simulating our weather, but so poor at predicting our moods. Our complexity is greater than that of our weather, and each of us is tuned to read and respond to one another.
Their intelligence is different. It is based on very large quantities of data that we cannot absorb. Our computers don’t have a complex internal model of who we are. They don’t understand the human condition. They are not tuned to respond to us as we are to each other.
Embodiment factors encapsulate a profound thing about the nature of humans. Our locked in intelligence means that we are striving to communicate, so we put a lot of thought into what we’re communicating with. And if we’re communicating with something complex, we naturally anthropomorphize them.
We give our dogs, our cats, and our cars human motivations. We do the same with our computers. We anthropomorphize them. We assume that they have the same objectives as us and the same constraints. They don’t.
This means, that when we worry about artificial intelligence, we worry about the wrong things. We fear computers that behave like more powerful versions of ourselves that will struggle to outcompete us.
In reality, the challenge is that our computers cannot be human enough. They cannot understand us with the depth we understand one another. They drop below our cognitive radar and operate outside our mental models.
The real danger is that computers don’t anthropomorphize. They’ll make decisions in isolation from us without our supervision because they can’t communicate truly and deeply with us.
New Flow of Information
Classically the field of statistics focused on mediating the relationship between the machine and the human. Our limited bandwidth of communication means we tend to over-interpret the limited information that we are given, in the extreme we assign motives and desires to inanimate objects (a process known as anthropomorphizing). Much of mathematical statistics was developed to help temper this tendency and understand when we are valid in drawing conclusions from data.
Data science brings new challenges. In particular, there is a very large bandwidth connection between the machine and data. This means that our relationship with data is now commonly being mediated by the machine. Whether this is in the acquisition of new data, which now happens by happenstance rather than with purpose, or the interpretation of that data where we are increasingly relying on machines to summarize what the data contains. This is leading to the emerging field of data science, which must not only deal with the same challenges that mathematical statistics faced in tempering our tendency to over interpret data but must also deal with the possibility that the machine has either inadvertently or maliciously misrepresented the underlying data.
A Six Word Novel
See Lawrence (2024) baby shoes p. 368.
But this is a very different kind of intelligence than ours. A computer cannot understand the depth of the Ernest Hemingway’s apocryphal six-word novel: “For Sale, Baby Shoes, Never worn”, because it isn’t equipped with that ability to model the complexity of humanity that underlies that statement.
Blake’s Newton
William Blake’s rendering of Newton captures humans in a particular state. He is trance-like absorbed in simple geometric shapes. The feel of dreams is enhanced by the underwater location, and the nature of the focus is enhanced because he ignores the complexity of the sea life around him.
See Lawrence (2024) Blake, William Newton p. 121–123.
The caption in the Tate Britain reads:
Here, Blake satirises the 17th-century mathematician Isaac Newton. Portrayed as a muscular youth, Newton seems to be underwater, sitting on a rock covered with colourful coral and lichen. He crouches over a diagram, measuring it with a compass. Blake believed that Newton’s scientific approach to the world was too reductive. Here he implies Newton is so fixated on his calculations that he is blind to the world around him. This is one of only 12 large colour prints Blake made. He seems to have used an experimental hybrid of printing, drawing, and painting.
From the Tate Britain
See Lawrence (2024) Blake, William Newton p. 121–123, 258, 260, 283, 284, 301, 306.
System Zero
The Elephant and its Rider
Elephant as System One
You can also check my blog post on System Zero. This was also written in 2015.
See Lawrence (2024) System Zero p. 242–247, 306, 309, 329, 350, 355, 359, 361, 363, 364.
The Mechanical Elephant
Thinking Fast and Slow
The Hindoo Earth
Reacting Fast and Slow
Reflexive and Reflective Intelligence
Another distinction I find helpful when thinking about intelligence is the difference between reflexive actions and reflective actions. We are much more aware of our reflections, but most actions we take are reflexive. And this can lead to an underestimate of the importance of our reflexive actions.
\[\text{reflect} \Longleftrightarrow \text{reflex}\]
It is our reflective capabilities that distinguish us from so many lower forms of intelligence. And it is also in reflective thinking that we can contextualise and justify our actions.
Reflective actions require longer timescales to deploy, often when we are in the moment it is the reflexive thinking that takes over. Naturally our biases about the world can enter in either our reflective or reflexive thinking, but biases associated with reflexive thinking are likely to be those we are unaware of.
This interaction between reflexive and reflective, where our reflective-self can place us within a wider cultural context, would seem key to better human decision making. If the reflexive-self can learn from the reflective-self to make better decisions, or if we have mechanisms of doubt that allow our reflective-self to intervene when our reflexive-decisions have consequences, then our reflexive thinking can be “lifted” to better reflect the results of our actions.
Behind the Eye
The book, “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell” by J. Kevin O’Regan (O’Regan, 2011) suggests a sensorimotor approach to understanding our consciousness. One that depends on how our senses interact with the world around us. The implication is that our consciousness is as much a function of our environment as of our mind. This is particularly interesting for social interaction, where our external environment is populated by other intelligent entities. If we accept this interpretation it would imply that we should pay a lot of attention to modes of human to human interaction when developing environments in which we can feel comfortable and able to perform.
Amelia Earhart
On 20th May 1932 Amelia Earhart took off in her Lockheed Vega from Harbour Grace in Canada. She called her plane the ‘Little Red Bus’. She travelled 2000 miles across open ocean, travelling through a storm, facing flames from her exhaust manifold, losing her altimeter. Flying until she sighted the Irish coast, tracking the coast until she saw a railway and following it until she saw a town, Londonderry. She landed nearby in a meadow.
Earhart had navigated initially by dead reckoning and then through vision. Her hand was directly connected to the control surfaces of her plane through a series of linkages and cables. She could literally feel the plane in flight, she could respond to it and her environment to control her direction and destiny.
See Lawrence (2024) Earhart, Amelia p. 200–205.
NACA Langley
The feel of an aircraft is a repeated theme in the early years of flight. In response to perceived European advances in flight in the First World War, the US introduced the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. Under the committee a proving ground for aircraft was formed at Langley Field in Virginia. During the Second World War Bob Gilruth published a report on the flying qualities of aircraft that characterised how this feel could be translated into numbers.
See Lawrence (2024) Gilruth, Bob p. 190-192.
See Lawrence (2024) National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) p. 163–168. One of Gilruth’s collaborators suggested that
Hawker Hurricane airplane. A heavily armed fighter airplane noted for its role in the Battle of Britain, the Hurricane’s flying qualities were found to be generally satisfactory. The most notable deficiencies were heavy aileron forces at high speeds and large friction in the controls.
W. Hewitt Phillips1
and
Supermarine Spitfire airplane. A high-performance fighter noted for its role in the Battle of Britain and throughout WW II, the Spitfire had desirably light elevator control forces in maneuvers and near neutral longitudinal stability. Its greatest deficiency from the combat standpoint was heavy aileron forces and sluggish roll response at high speeds.
W. Hewitt Phillips2
Gilruth went beyond the reports of feel to characterise how the plane should respond to different inputs on the control stick. In other words he quantified that feel of the plane.
Gilrtuth’s work was in the spirit of Lord Kelvin’s quote on measurement
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarely, in your thoughts advanced to the stage of science.
From Chapter 3, pg 73 of Thomson (1889)
The aim was to convert a qualitative property of aircraft into quantitative measurement, thereby allowing their improvement.
Eagle from Columbia
This picture, taken by Michael Collins aboard the Columbia command module, of Eagle’s return from the Moon, with the Earth in the background highlights the rendezvous radar used to to allow the crafts to dock.
See Lawrence (2024) Blue Marble (photograph) p. 367.
That radar was one sensing part of Eagle’s many automated systems (Mindell, 2008). These systems could have allowed Eagle to land without human intervention, but Armstrong chose to manually place Eagle in the Sea of Tranquility to avoid a boulder field.
The Apollo Guidance Computer mediated Armstrong’s commands, provided through a joystick, allowing him to control the craft when he input but not providing any direct connection between him and the thrusters.
See Lawrence (2024) Apollo 11 p. 202-210.
(Chater, 2019)
Thinking
Thinking is acting in an imagined space
Konrad Lorenz Lorenz (1977)
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(Lorenz, 1977)
Human Analogue Machine
Recent breakthroughs in generative models, particularly large language models, have enabled machines that, for the first time, can converse plausibly with other humans.
The Apollo guidance computer provided Armstrong with an analogy when he landed it on the Moon. He controlled it through a stick which provided him with an analogy. The analogy is based in the experience that Amelia Earhart had when she flew her plane. Armstrong’s control exploited his experience as a test pilot flying planes that had control columns which were directly connected to their control surfaces.
The generative systems we have produced do not provide us with the “AI” of science fiction. Because their intelligence is based on emulating human knowledge. Through being forced to reproduce our literature and our art they have developed aspects which are analogous to the cultural proxy truths we use to describe our world.
These machines are to humans what the MONIAC was the British economy. Not a replacement, but an analogue computer that captures some aspects of humanity while providing advantages of high bandwidth of the machine.
HAM
The Human-Analogue Machine or HAM therefore provides a route through which we could better understand our world through improving the way we interact with machines.
The HAM can provide an interface between the digital computer and the human allowing humans to work closely with computers regardless of their understandin gf the more technical parts of software engineering.
Of course this route provides new routes for manipulation, new ways in which the machine can undermine our autonomy or exploit our cognitive foibles. The major challenge we face is steering between these worlds where we gain the advantage of the computer’s bandwidth without undermining our culture and individual autonomy.
See Lawrence (2024) human-analogue machine (HAMs) p. 343-347, 359-359, 365-368.
The Blue Marble
The Blue Marble image of the earth taken from Apollo 17 which became a symbol of the environmental movement. The photo was taken in December 1972. It gave us context. An ability to move beyond our observer bias and see us as we are. Isolated, fragile, and alone. Clinging to a rock orbiting the sun.
Atrophy and Cognitive Flattening
Even if we calibrate these tools correctly so that they do represent the world appropriately we are at risk. The hippocampus is part of our brain’s cortex, oOne role of our hippocampus is in navigation, knowing how to move from one place to another.
Our prefrontal cortex, the size of which differentiates us from other primates and mammals, is the seat of our planning and of our higher intelligence. It fires in sympathy with our hippocampus.
By becoming overreliant on HAMs and there interface to the digital computer are we at risk of suffering from the same deskilling we perceive in our navigational skills? Does this place us at risk of sleepwalking into a world that is managed by the machine even as we believe that we are managing it ourselves?
Elohim Creating Adam
Blake’s vision of the creation of man, known as Elohim Creating Adam, is a strong contrast to Michelangelo’s. The faces of both God and Adam show deep anguish. The image is closer to representations of Prometheus receiving his punishment for sharing his knowledge of fire than to the languid ecstasy we see in Michelangelo’s representation.
The caption in the Tate reads:
Elohim is a Hebrew name for God. This picture illustrates the Book of Genesis: ‘And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground’. Adam is shown growing out of the earth, a piece of which Elohim holds in his left hand.
For Blake the God of the Old Testament was a false god. He believed the Fall of Man took place not in the Garden of Eden, but at the time of creation shown here, when man was dragged from the spiritual realm and made material.
From the Tate Britain
Blake’s vision is demonstrating the frustrations we experience when the (complex) real world doesn’t manifest in the way we’d hoped.
See Lawrence (2024) Blake, William Elohim Creating Adam p. 121, 217–18.
The Atomic Human
Thanks!
For more information on these subjects and more you might want to check the following resources.
- book: The Atomic Human
- twitter: @lawrennd
- podcast: The Talking Machines
- newspaper: Guardian Profile Page
- blog: http://inverseprobability.com